As far as I understand, most Gulf Arab countries have nationalised oil companies like Aramco etc. So why was it such a big deal that the Iranians would do the same. I understand there was also concern of Soviet access to the Gulf, but the real trigger was the nationalisation policies.

With discussions surrounding the potential return of Iran's Crown Prince, I've been reflecting on the deeper historical events that have shaped Iran's modern trajectory.

I understand that the United States and the United Kingdom played direct roles in the 1953 coup that removed Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh from power and restored Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as Shah. Backed strongly by the West, the Shah's regime ruled for decades and was known for its political repression, including the actions of SAVAK, his secret police.

In 1979, when the Shah was allowed into the U.S. for medical treatment, that decision appeared to be a major flashpoint that fueled revolutionary anger, ultimately contributing to the Islamic Revolution and the U.S. embassy hostage crisis.

I'm also aware that Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as National Security Advisor under President Carter, underestimated the depth of revolutionary sentiment within Iran. His misjudgment represents a key failure in U.S. foreign policy at the time.

My questions:

1. What specific roles did the U.S. and U.K. play in the 1953 coup against Mossadegh?

2. How did the Shah's return to power reshape Iranian society and politics in the following decades?

3. How do historians assess the U.S. decision to admit the Shah in 1979 in terms of its impact on the Islamic Revolution?

4. How is Brzezinski's strategy and misreading of the situation evaluated in contemporary scholarship on U.S. foreign policy?

I appreciate any insights or recommended sources you may have. Thank you!

Would America and the UK haved allowed Iran to take control and sell its own oil reserves?

Even in this day, if the regime is finally overthrown, will Iranians truly be free, or will their freedom be under the condition that they allow seizure of their resources to foreign forces?

A link to the CIA's documents would be handy as well. From what I understand many were destroyed, but there were some that survived that I had a link handy for. Now it's expired and I can't find it.

I'm ordering Kinzer's book "All the Shah's Men" by Stephen Kinzer on the lasting impacts of the move.

Thanks!

I'm seeing a lot of confusing and conflicting perspectives - would love some help making sense of it all.

On the one hand, people say the president who was overthrown wasn't elected democratically - but appointed by the Shah who was the ruler of Iran since 1921.

On the other hand, people say the president was elected democratically and overthrown by a British backed coup.

So what really happened, is anything still up for debate? Or are all major facts agreed upon (by most people)

TL;DR: The US/British operation to overthrow Mossadeq failed in 1953, but three days later the clergy, bazaar merchants, with widening support of the middle and upper classes, overthrew Mossadeq successfully for their own reasons.

So this has been a pet peeve of mine for a while. But I really can't blame anyone for this piece of bad history given how consistent it is, and how well it fits into the 'American Cold War narrative'. There are currently plenty of really bad Iranian history posts all across Reddit, including this one, which posits that Iran is "unfree" because of a [failed] coup attempt in 1953. This is of course a nonsensical order of events, the 1979 Iranian Revolution is so much more complicated, but is almost always summed up as: "Mossadeq was overthrown in 1953 by the US, so angry Iranians overthrew the Shah and setup an Islamic Republic in 1979"... suffice it to say, this line of thinking doesn't make sense when put to even a little bit of scrutiny. The Shah's regime was stable after 1953, and his overthrow in 1979 was never inevitable.

But I am here to put the record straight on the 1953 overthrow of Mossadeq, not the reasons for the 1979 Revolution which would require a much larger post. Specifically I will show that the overthrow of Mossadeq was precipitated by a quickly changing political situation in Iran, rather than the top-down American CIA achievement that it was clearly not but continues to be heralded as.

Source:

For this I'm using Michael Axworthy book, Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic (2013). It remains the best and most up to date work by an Iran historian about the various upheavals in 20th century Iranian history. I highly recommend the book as a result. All the quotes here are from his book.

First Phase (1952-1953):

Mossadeq is in power. During the "July Crisis" he faced down the Shah, and was able to choose the Minister of War that he wanted. He began to push for land reform and further nationalization of certain industries which threatened both conservative landowners (who had previously dominated Parliament) and Bazaari merchants. He then appointed "secular-minded and anticlerical ministers" to Parliament, turning the most senior Shi'ite ayatollah (the Marja'), Kashani, against him. What allowed Mossadeq to move with such speed was that he had taken on "emergency powers" in the parliament (majles), after the July Crisis, and was effectively ruling by decree. Having supported Mossadeq in July, Kashani and his followers began to express doubts about the government actions against the constitution. They also protested against plans to give women the vote and rescind a ban on the sale of alcohol. When Mossadeq asked for an extension of his emergency powers, clerical members of the Majles who supported Kashani left the National Front coalition and setup their own Islamic fraction.

So at this point in 1953 Mossadeq, who had once had the support of the Bazaari's and Shi'ite 'ulema (clergy) in a grand 'National Front' coalition, now had lost their support, including that of rich landowners and of course the Shah and his entourage.

Axworthy puts it like this:

So although a referendum in July 1953 again showed huge support for Mossadeq, there were doubts about the fairness of the poll, and important leaders of the traditional middle class – the clergy and the bazaaris – had gone over to the conservative, monarchist side. (pg. 50)

I think we need to see Mossadeq not as singular trend however, but as part of a larger post-WW2 Middle East trend towards "secular reforming autocrats", not as an exception to this. The difference is he came to power through parliament, rather than through military coup like Nasser, Gaddafi, Boumediene etc. But like the latter examples, he ended up ruling 'autocratically' (this being a relative term of course) during his short stay in power. His ultimate failure would be in presuming the public would remain on his side, and that he could rule autocratically without the support of any of the major power players in Iran. Nasser had the army to support him, while Mossadeq's legitimacy was isolated to public support for his emergency powers - a very flimsy base.

American [Failed] Coup Attempt:

This is the story we all know (I will hence keep it brief). Mossadeq threatened British oil, the British cajoled the Americans into helping them overthrow Mossadeq as a result. The British called it "Operation Boot" and the Americans called it "Operation Ajax". The plan was to eject Mossadeq, and replace him with General Zahedi as Prime Minister.

So on the night of 15/16 August 1953, Colonel Nasiri of the Imperial Guard led an armoured column to Mossadeq's residence in Tehran, giving him a royal decree (ferman) that removed him from office. But the plotters plans had been leaked. Nasiri was intercepted on Mossadeq's doorstep by officers loyal to the elected government, commanded by General Riahi, the Chief of Staff.

They arrested Nasiri and put him behind bars. In the morning Tehran Radio announced that a coup attempt had been foiled. Mossadeq himself came on air and named the Shah and unspecified foreigners as the instigators. Within minutes of the broadcast, taking only Soraya [Shah's wife], the pilot and one other companion with him, the Shah flew out of the country in a light aircraft, to Baghdad. From there he flew on to Rome. (pg. 53)

The Iranian ambassador in Rome actually ignored the Shah, showing that loyalty was with the Mossadeq government in Tehran. Reza Shah Pahlavi and his wife contemplated buying a farm in Italy somewhere.

Most importantly:

Back in Tehran, crowds went onto the streets to demonstrate for Mossadeq, and Kermit Roosevelt sent a telegram to Washington to break the bad news that his coup attempt had failed. (pg. 53)

Immediate Aftermath of the Failed Coup:

This is where building a narrative of events gets tricky, and why the myth of CIA overthrow has been so persistent. I will rely heavily on Axworthy as a result.

But in the immediate aftermath of the failed CIA backed coup attempt, there was massive anti-Shah protests across Iran, with his statue being toppled everywhere. The American ambassador told Mossadeq that the Tudeh Party (Communist party) was growing in strength, and might seize the state. The Shi'ite clerics and Bazaar merchants, alarmed at the possibility of an atheistic communist regime, stepped in to intervene.

Many if not most of the officers that Roosevelt had been dealing with had been arrested at Mossadeq’s orders, Zahedi himself was in hiding, and the CIA ’s ability to influence events must have been damaged, to say the least. The Imperial Guard had been disarmed (in the pre-coup planning the CIA assessment had been that most police and army units in the capital were loyal to Mossadeq in any case). Once again, Tudeh networks within the armed forces helped Mossadeq to do this effectively. There is evidence that most of the US actors in Tehran had given up the game; in Washington, Eisenhower’s advisers were telling him that the CIA had failed, and it would now be necessary to ‘snuggle up’ to Mossadeq if the US were to retrieve anything from the situation. (pg. 54)

The Real Overthrow of Mossadeq:

But the situation, and some loyalties, were shifting. On the afternoon of Monday 17 August, deciding that enough was enough, Mossadeq told Tudeh to back down and authorized the police and army to use force to break up the Tudeh- led demonstrations if necessary. This they did the next day – leaving the field open for anti-Mossadeq and pro-Shah demonstrations, which followed on 19 August. After their experience on the Tuesday, Tudeh kept their people at home, and a confrontation developed outside Mossadeq’s residence, in which a number of brawny members of bazaar zur-khaneh seem to have participated. This turned to violence as some troops arrived, including six Sherman tanks. There was an exchange of fire between these tanks and the soldiers guarding the house. The shooting continued for two hours, with many casualties, and three tanks that had been in position to defend the house were destroyed. Meanwhile, pro-Shah demonstrators took over the radio station and began broadcasting from there. Eventually, with General Riahi telling him the situation was hopeless, Mossadeq gave up, announced at about 5PM that the building would no longer be defended and left by a ladder over a back wall. He [Mossadeq] was arrested the following day. Zahedi came out of hiding to take control as the new prime minister, and the Shah flew back to Tehran on 22 August. At the airport a military honour guard turned out to welcome him, but was kept at a distance in case one of the soldiers made an assassination attempt. (pg. 55)

Mossadeq had been overthrown three days after the failed CIA attempt. According to Axworthy, the Eisenhower administration was "dumbfounded" by this reversal of fortune. But again, this was not because of American CIA operatives, but because of local political actors (the Shi'ite clergy, Bazaari's and others in the conservative upper and middle class).

Why does the CIA coup myth persist?:

What had happened? Roosevelt and the CIA did their best to take the credit later, claiming the coup as one of their greatest successes against the Soviets in the Cold War. Among other things, they claimed that they passed $ 10,000 to Ayatollah Kashani, to pay mobs to turn out on the streets on 19 August. But Kashani and other senior clergy did not need money to persuade them to act against Mossadeq, and their influence and connections were quite enough to bring crowds on to the streets without American cash. In fact, Kashani himself had created the conditions for the coup by turning against Mossadeq earlier in the year. (pg. 55)

In summation, the Shi'ite clergy was more effective in turning out effective mobilizing action on the streets, than the CIA could ever have been. This was the not the first time the clergy had intervened in secular political life in the 20th century, nor would it be the last time. But it was indeed a rare show of force, of an institution that had traditionally been 'quietest' (aloof of secular politics). This is not the case of all Muslim countries, but in Shi'ite Iran, where the clergy was highly organized, the clergy could be an effective political force, and lever against 'secular oppression' [of their own definition]. So whereas in other Middle East countries, where the Muslim clergy had been co-opted (Saudi Arabia) or coerced (Egypt) by authoritarian leaders, religious inspired terrorism became one answer to perceived (and very real) 'oppression'. In Iran however the clergy was never subdued, and remained highly independent, despite many attempts by the Pahlavi's to thwart them*, and hence remained to be an outlet for 'anger' against any given regime.

*In a sense I would 'liken' it to the role of the Catholic Church in 'balancing' the power of Mussolini in Italy. The Church was never subdued by Mussolini, and remained independent. Unlike for instance in neighbouring NSDAP Germany.

Thank you for reading, and happy New Year!

Given the possible war in Iran, it's important for people to understand our role in their history: "The U.S. has not publicly called for regime change in the current conflict, but over 70 years ago, it played a key role in ousting Tehran’s government — although the historical circumstances were very different."

From my understanding a coup, by definition, has to be an illegal seizure of power. How can the infamous 1953 Iranian Coup be a Coup when the Shah of Iran had the Constitutional Right to dismiss any Prime Minister they wanted to?

Did CIA restore the Shah to his throne? TPAJAX did not "restore" the Shah to his throne either technically or constitutionally. Although the Iranian monarch left Tehran during the operation, he never abdicated. Mossadeq's argument that the Shah's firmans were invalid was disingenuous. The Iranian constitution gave the Shah the right to dismiss the Prime Minister. As soon as Mossadeq refused to obey the Shah's legal order, he was rebelling against constitutional authority. From that point on, TPAJAX became an operation to remove the usurper Mossadeq and permit Zahedi, the legitimate Prime Minister, to take office. Unlike Mossadeq's government, Zahedi's government recognized the Shah's constitutional authority

Mohammed Mosaddegh is not overthrown, or at the very least the UK and US stay out of the situation entirely and just let it play out

What if the CIA never overthrew Mohammed Mossadegh? How different would Iran be today socially, politically and economically and what would the wider geopolitics of the Middle East look like?