OKTA for Lastpass
I don't think anyone has asked this yet: Enterprise users who use an IdP for SSO never had to create a password to access their vault. What does this breach mean for them?
Enterprise vaults still have keys. It's just that the vault passwords are behind the scenes of the SSO federation. There is a LastPass whitepaper that describes how the vault keys work for several major IdPs. It looks like Reddit blocks the actual link hosted on lastpass.com, so just use your favorite search engine and search for "LastPass technical whitepaper."
For example, for organizations using Okta, there are two key parts for each vault:
K1: A single, randomly-generated, organization-wide key used by all federated users in that org that is stored in Okta.
K2: A randomly-generated, unique-per-vault key, stored with LastPass (but LastPass claims no evidence these were stolen).
An algorithmic operation - described in the whitepaper - runs K1 and K2 through an XOR operation, then a SHA-256 operation, then base64 to derive the single master key for a given vault in the org.
Because both K1 and K2 are randomly generated and go through the algorithmic operation, it is decidedly very difficult for anyone to guess at the key or brute force it. Nothing is impossible; however, and given infinite time and resources all the keys can and would be cracked.
More on reddit.comUnlock with SSO - other cases
Palo Alto with OKTA integration CLI + GUI
Videos
We have lastpass and as I roll it out to users I am a little confused about whether or not I should implement OKTA for LP. We use OKTA for most other apps. Seems like LP having its own set of credentials and MFA might be safe as if a user is compromised wouldn't that allow the attacker access to everything in Lastpass?